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Stallman v. Youngquist 1 "No, You Can't
Sue Mommy in Illinois;" The Illinois
Supreme Court Rejects Maternal Prenatal
Civil Liability
I.

INTRODUCTION

The public policy rationales underlying the parent-child tort

immunity doctrine2 have been subjected to extensive and thorough
criticism. 3 This attack has lead a substantial number of jurisdictions
to abrogate parental immunity either in whole or in part.4 The
1. 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
2. The parent-child tort immunity doctrine bars a child from maintaining a
cause of action against its parent, and a parent against his or her child, for personal

injuries resulting from tortious conduct. See W. KEETON, Et Al,
ON THE LAW OF TORTS, sec. 122, at 904 (5th ed. 1984).

PROSSER AND KEETON

3. See, e.g., Hollister, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of
a Justification, 50 FORDHAm L. REv. 489 (1982); Note, "Stallman v. Youngquist:
Parent-Child Tort Immunity: Will Illinois Ever Give This Doctrine the Examination
and Analysis it Deserves?" 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 807 (1986). For a thorough
review of the development and abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine, see
Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981).
4. Currently, nineteen jurisdictions do not recognize parental immunity in any
form. See, e.g., Alaska: Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Arizona: Streenz
v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); California: Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Ca. Rptr. 288 (1971); Hawaii: Petersen v. City and County
of Honolulu, 53 Haw. 440, 496 P.2d 4 (1972); Kansas: Nocktonick v. Nocktonick,
227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Kentucky: Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921
(Ky. 1970); Louisiana: Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So.2d
259 (1971); Minnesota: Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); New
Hampshire: Vickers v. Vickers, 109 N.H. 69, 242 A.2d 57 (1968); New York: Gelbman
v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Nevada:
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); North Dakota: Nuelle v.
Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Ohio: Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94,
480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Oregon: Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984);
Pennsylvania: Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); South Carolina:
Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Texas: Felderhoff v. Felderhoff,
473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971); Vermont: Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191
(1977); Wisconsin: Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Nine other jurisdictions have abrogated the doctrine in part. See, e.g., Connecticut: Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972); Deleware: Schneider v.
Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Maine: Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979);
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jurisdictional trend toward abrogating the doctrine, 5 coupled with the
recognized right of a fetus, subsequently born alive, to recover for
tortious prenatal injuries from third parties, 6 has prompted one commentator to suggest that it would be "only a short step" before courts
begin to recognize a cause of action by a child against its mother for
7
negligent infliction of prenatal injuries.
This "short step" was taken by the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the First District when confronted with this issue in Stallman v.
Youngquist. s The Stallman II court abrogated parental immunity
within the context of automobile driver negligence. 9 More importantly,
the appellate court, without addressing the implications of its decision,
also recognized a fetus' cause of action against its mother for negligent
prenatal injuries upon birth. 0 Because in the past the Illinois courts
Massachusetts; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Michigan: Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); New Jersey: Guterman
v. Guterman, 66 N.J. 69, 328 A.2d 233 (1974); North Carolina: Ledwell v. Berry, 39
N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978); Virginia: Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181,
183 S.E.2d 190 (1971); West Virginia: Lee v. Comer, 159 W. Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d
721 (1976).
5. The trend may be a result of "growing judicial distaste for a rule of law
which in one sweep disqualifies an entire class of injured minors." Gibson v. Gibson,
3 Cal. 3d 914, 918, 479 P.2d 648, 650, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290 (1971). See also Shearer
v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 95, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1985) ("[ilf the doctrine of
parental immunity as posited were a good and useful rule of law, we could reasonably
presume that the experience of the law would empirically establish the wisdom of
that doctrine ...

[tihat has not happened").

6. Illinois first recognized this cause of action in Amann v. Faidy, 415 Il.
422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1963). See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
7. Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for
Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 325 (1984). This
Note restricts its analysis to maternal prenatal civil liability. Although important to
this topic, a discussion of criminal liability for maternal prenatal injuries and state
intervention during pregnancy to protect the fetus is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a scholarly bibliography which indentifies both legal and medical literature which
address these and other related topics, see Trammel, Fetal Rights - A Bibliography,
10 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 70 (1988).
8. 152 Il. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920 (Ist Dist. 1987).
Before reaching the Illinois Supreme Court, Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267,
531 N.E.2d 355 (1988), the case went before the circuit court and appellate court
twice. The 1987 appellate court decision is referred to as Stallman II throughout this
Note. The first appearance before the appellate court, Stallman v. Youngquist, 129
Ill. App. 3d 862, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1st. Dist. 1984) will be referred to as Stallman I.
The Illinois Supreme Court decision of the case will be referred to as Stallman
throughout this Note.
9. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Il1. App. 3d at 694, 504 N.E.2d at 926.
10. Id. at 694, 504 N.E.2d at 926.
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had steadfastly maintained parental immunity despite substantial contravening authority from other jurisdictions, the decision can be
considered nothing less than dramatic. The decision was also very
short lived.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court did not rely upon the
traditional justifications for parental immunity in its decision to
reverse." The supreme court considered that its refusal to recognize
maternal prenatal civil liability obviated the need to discuss the status
of the parental immunity doctrine. 2 The court, therefore, focused
squarely on the complex and highly controversial conflict between a
child's interest in being born with a sound mind and body and a
3
woman's right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
The framework of the court's opinion was built upon an analysis4
issues: (1) whether a mother owes a legal duty to her fetus;'
four
of
(2) the difficulty in establishing an appropriate judicially defined
standard of care if the new duty was to be imposed upon expectant
mothers; 5 (3) the unique relationship between a mother and her
fetus;' 6 and (4) the potential negative ramifications that a decision
recognizing this cause of action would have on the privacy rights of
all women. 17 After weighing the competing interests and rights of a
fetus and its mother, the court concluded that a mother's rights were
superior to those of a fetus. 8 Therefore, maternal prenatal civil
liability was rejected.
The impact of the Stallman decision for Illinois is unequivocally
clear: unless and until the legislature decides otherwise, a woman's
privacy rights will be safeguarded against excessive state intrusion.
The decision is also equally clear that a child who has been negligently
injured in utero by its mother is without a remedy with respect to its
mother. Furthermore, by implication, parent-child tort immunity
remains a viable doctrine in Illinois.
11. The Amicus Curiae brief for the Illinois Association of Defense Trial
Counsel submitted to the Illinois Supreme Court for the Stallman decision identified
the three major traditional justifications in support of parental immunity: (1) the
maintenance of peace and harmony in the family; (2) the possibility of collusion
between family members; and (3) preserving parental authority and discipline.
12. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
13. Id. at 275-80, 531 N.E.2d at 359-60.
14. Id. at 278-79, 531 N.E.2d at 360-61.
15. Id. at 278-80, 531 N.E.2d at 360-61.
16. Id. at 275-80, 531 N.E.2d at 359-60.
17. Id. at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
18. Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 358.
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This note will provide historical background for parental immunity and examine the role the doctrine played in the factual and
procedural history of the Stallman case before it reached the Illinois

Supreme Court. The analytical framework of issues before the su-

preme court will be examined and the rationales employed by the
court will be discussed. Next, this Note will assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the opionion, and support the supreme court's position

that the imposition of maternal prenatal civil liability entails significant dangers to a woman's privacy rights and should be avoided. This
Note will conclude with a discussion of the impact of the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Stallman on a woman's privacy rights
and on the parental immunity doctrine.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY

To provide the appropriate contextual setting of the Stallman
decision it is necessary to briefly discuss the adoption of parental
immunity, the rationales supporting it, and the numerous exceptions
to it. Understanding these developments will help to clarify why the
appellate court in Stallman II ultimately rejected the doctrine as being
unsuitable in light of modern conditions and public policy.
The parental immunity doctrine was conceived by the American
courts, 19 although it was established relatively late in the American
common law tradition. 20 The first decision to recognize parental
immunity came in 1891 in Hewellette v. George.2' Hewellette was the
19. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 690, 504 N.E.2d 920,
924 (1987); Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family - Husband &
Wife - Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 182 (1961).
20. Beal, supra note 7, at 333.
21. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). This case involved an action by a child
against her mother for falsely imprisoning her in an asylum. The minor child was
married but separated from her husband at the time of the imprisonment. The facts
were confused as to whether the child was emancipated or whether the minor was
living with her mother in the traditional parent-child setting. Despite the confused
factual setting, the court, without citing any authority, stated the reasons why the
daughter should not be allowed to maintain an action against her mother:
[T]he peace of society and the families composing society, and a sound
public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests
of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the
assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the
hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor
child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the
child can be heard to demand.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
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first of three cases known as the "great trilogy" which established
the doctrine in the United States. 22 In Illinois, the parental immunity
doctrine was first adopted by an appellate court in 1895 in Foley v.

Foley.23

As parental immunity spread throughout most jurisdictions, sev24
eral justifications for the doctrine were conceived by the courts. In
22. The Tennessee Supreme Court in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,
77 S.W. 664 (1903) was the second case in the "great trilogy." That court cited
Hewellette with approval and stated that the "well settled rule controlling the relation
of father and child" included the right of a parent to chastise the child. Id. at 393,
77 S.W. at 665.
Roller V. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), the last case of the "great
trilogy" contains a particularly brutal fact situation. In Roller, the Washington State
Supreme Court denied a daughter's cause of action against her father for personal
injuries incurred as a result of the father raping the daughter. The court justified its
decision on the grounds that society has an interest in promoting and preserving
domestic harmony and because of the difficulty in drawing the line in future parentchild tort settings. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
The common law did allow children to bring actions in property and contract
against their parents. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 48 N.H. 352, 353, 150 A. 905, 906
(1930). See also, CooLEY, LAW OF TORTS 197 (1984); McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAxv. L. REv. 1030, 1079 (1930).
23. 61 11. App. 577, 578-80 (1895). Foley involved a child who brought action
against his uncle (the child's adopted father) for personal injuries resulting from a
battery, and for negligent medical treatment after the child's arm was broken by a
vicious horse. The jury was instructed as follows:
1. The court instructs the jury that if a parent, or one sustaining that
relation to a child, treats that child inhumanly or cruelly, so as to injure it
in health or limb, the parents are subject to criminal prosecution, and upon
conviction punished. But a child can not [sic] maintain a civil action for
damages against its parent for such injury. This rule of law, as the court
conceives, is founded upon consideration of public policy, affecting the
family government, that is, that the child shall not contest with the parent
the parent's right to govern the child.
Id. at 579.
Apparently unaware of the decision in Hewellette, the court cited no authority when
it formulated the rule of parent-child tort immunity:
It is doubtless the law, that a child can not [sic] maintain an action for
damages on account of maltreatment against a parent, whether the relation
is by blood, or created by adoption, under the statute, followed by all the
legal consequences, and incidents of the natural relation.
Id. at 580.
24. Frequent justifications for the doctrine included:
1. Society's concern for the preservation of the family unit;
2. Society's concern for the preservation of parental authority;
3. The injured child already has a remedy in criminal proceedings or in

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 11

Illinois, the establishment of parental immunity was founded upon
public policy considerations. 21 In particular, the Illinois courts have
relied on two rationales supporting the doctrine: (1) maintaining peace
and harmony within the family by avoiding litigation between family
members; 26 and (2) the need to maintain parental authority and
discipline. 27 A third justification articulated during the Stallman litigation was the need to avoid collusive claims between family mem2
bers.

1

Despite these consistently articulated justifications for parental
immunity, most jurisdictions have been unwilling to protect parents
from liability in every setting. This reluctance to deny relief to children
under certain circumstances lead courts to create exception after
exception to the rule. 29 These exceptions were generally created when
the articulated purposes of the doctrine would not be fulfilled by
barring the child's cause of action.3 0

removal from his parent's custody;
4. The preservation of the family exchequer;
5. The suggested analogy between husband and wife immunity;
6. The possibility that the parent could inherit any judgment that the child
might recover;
7. The possibility that frivolous claims might flood the courts; and
8. The dangers of fraud and collusion between parties where there is
insurance available.
See Beal, supra note 7, at 335.
25. Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164, 169 (1933). See also
Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 557, (1895) supra note 23.
26. See, e.g., Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 454, 216 N.E.2d 137,
139 (1966); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Zawaski v.
Frainey, 149 Il1. App. 3d 1045, 501 N.E.2d 570 (1st Dist. 1986); Schenk v. Schenk,
100 Il. App. 2d 100, 241 N.E.2d 12 (4th Dist. 1968). See also, Illinois Family
Immunity: The Unequal Protection of Junior, 55 CHI. B. REc. 219, 222 (MarchApril 1974) ("The very fact of a lawsuit ... is what must hypothetically send family

tempers flaring.").
27. See, e.g., Zawaski v. Frainey, 149 Ill. App. 1045, 501 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist.
1986); Wilkosz v. Wilkosz, 124 Il. App. 3d 904, 909, 464 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (2d
Dist. 1984); Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577, 579 (2d Dist. 1895).
28. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 693, 504 N.E.2d 920, 926

(1st Dist. 1987). See also Ingram & Barder, The Decline of the Doctrine of ParentChild Tort Immunity, 68 ILL. B.J. 596, 596-97 (1979-80) (noting that while the

availability of liability insurance may lessen the burden of litigation between family
members financially, the availability of such insurance increases the likelihood of
collusion).
29. See Beal, supra note 7, at 337-57 for a thorough examination of the varying
restrictions of parental immunity in different jurisdictions.
30. Id. at 337-38.
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Illinois appellate courts have also tended to restrict, rather than
expand, the scope of the immunity doctrine. Unlike the Illinois
Supreme Court, which remained faithful to the doctrine except in the
3
case of willful or wanton parental conduct, ' the Illinois appellate
courts have continuously carved out a number of exceptions to limit
the rule's effect.3 2 Perhaps the most important exception to the Illinois
concept of parental immunity is the so-called "family purpose"
exception first recognized in Schenk v. Schenk."
The "family purpose" exception allows a cause of action by a
parent or child against one another if the conduct resulting in a tort
arose outside the scope of the family relationship and was not directly
connected with a family purpose.3 4 The "family purpose" exception

played an important role in the Stallman litigation, as discussed below,
and it is within this context that the facts and procedural history of
the Stallman case can be fully explored.

31. See Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
32. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Beery, 128 Ill. App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 572 (1st
Dist. 1984) (exception to the immunity rule where a third party action was brought
against the parent for negligent supervision of the child); Moon v. Thompson, 127
I11.App. 3d 657, 469 N.E.2d 365 (1st Dist. 1984) (exception to the immunity rule
where a third party counterclaimed against the parent alleging that the parent's
negligence contributed to the child's injuries); Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d
68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (4th Dist. 1978) (exception to the immunity rule where a child's
cause of action was permitted upon parental violation of a statutory duty); Johnson
v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (2d Dist. 1972) (exception to the
immunity rule where the child's cause of action was against a deceased parent).
33. 100 I11.App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (4th Dist. 1968). In Schenk, the
plaintiff father brought an action against his minor daughter to recover damages for
injuries which he received when she negligently ran into him while driving an
automobile. On appeal, the appellate court, while claiming that many of the justifications for applying the unqualified parent-child tort immunity had eroded, concluded
that the rule had usefulness, and, generally, should be followed. However, it held
that the newly formed "family purpose" exception allowed the father's cause of
action. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 205-06, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14-15 (4th
Dist. 1968).
34. Id. at 206, 241 N.E.2d at 15. The fourth district applied the "family
purpose" limitation in Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 70, 372 N.E.2d
1127, 1128 (4th Dist. 1978) following Schenk. Panels in the first, second, and fifth
districts recognized the Schenk holding but found the exception inapplicable to the
cases before them. See Wilkosz v. Wilkosz, 124 Ill. App. 3d 904, 464 N.E.2d 1232
(1984); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d 770 (5th Dist. 1982);
Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 111. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349 (1st Dist. 1980); Illinois Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 I11.App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (2d Dist. 1980);
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d 826
(1st Dist. 1970).
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STALLMAN v. YOUNGQUIST: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff in the Stallman case was a child named Lindsay
Stallman who brought action against her mother, Bari Stallman, for
negligent infliction of prenatal injuries. On October 7, 1981, the
mother, Bari Stallman, was operating an automobile on an Illinois
highway. a5 When Bari made a left hand turn intending to enter the
driveway of a restaurant, her automobile collided with an automobile
driven by Clarence Youngquist. 3 6 At the time of the accident, Bari
was approximately five months pregnant with Lindsay.3 7 Bari gave
birth to Lindsay prematurely, and Lindsay's serious intestinal injuries
were discovered upon birth.38
Lindsay contended that the collision between her mother and
Youngquist was the proximate cause of her intestinal injuries, and
that these injuries were sustained in utero.3 9 Lindsay, therefore, through
her father Mark Stallman as next friend, brought an action against
Youngquist and her mother in an amended three-count complaint. 40
The first count alleged negligence on the part of Youngquist in
the operation of an automobile. 4' The second count alleged negligence
on the part of her mother, Bari, in the operation of an automobile. 42
The last count alleged willful and wanton conduct on the part of Bari
in the operation of an automobile. 4 Bari moved to dismiss the
negligence count against her as being insufficient to withstand the
application of the parental immunity doctrine. 4 The circuit court
45
granted the motion and Lindsay appealed.
35. Appellant's Brief at 1, Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473
N.E.2d 400 (1984).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 111. App. 3d 859, 860, 473 N.E.2d 400, 40001 (1984).
40. See Appellant's Brief at 1, Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859,
473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).
41. Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 1, Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Il1. App.
3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Appellant's Brief at 2, Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473
N.E.2d 400 (1984).
45. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984). On
appeal, Lindsay put forth these arguments: (1) that the question of whether the
accident occurred within the family relationship or was connected to a family purpose
was a question of fact and therefore could not be decided on a motion to dismiss;
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The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District reversed the
circuit court's dismissal of the negligence count. 4 The primary issue
on appeal before the Stallman I court was whether Lindsay's complaint asserting the mother's prenatal negligence stated a valid cause
of action. While recognizing that the immunity doctrine was still the
law in Illinois, the Stallman I court held that Lindsay stated a valid
cause of action against her mother for negligence if the "family
purpose" exception applied to the facts. 47 The court, therefore, remanded the case for a finding of facts and a determination as to
whether those facts fell within the "family purpose" exception to the
immunity doctrine .41
Upon remand, Bari moved for summary judgment. The circuit
court determined that Bari's conduct in driving to a restaurant was
49
directly connected to family purposes and objectives. Therefore, the
"family purpose" exception to the immunity doctrine was inapplicable, and the circuit court granted Bari's motion.50 Lindsay appealed
again.
Lindsay presented two arguments before the Stallman II court in
seeking to reverse the summary judgment. First, Lindsay argued that
although the court must accept the uncontested facts as true, more
5
than one conclusion could be inferred from those facts. " Second,
Lindsay urged the court52to reconsider the efficacy of the parental
immunity doctrine itself.
The appellate court did reevaluate the doctrine, but before doing
so, was compelled to address two preliminary issues. The first issue
was whether the Illinois Supreme Court had ever confronted and

(2) that the parental immunity doctrine was inapplicable to her because at the time
of the accident she was not a person (being only a fetus which her mother could
abort); and (3) that the parental immunity doctrine should be abolished. Id. at 860,
473 N.E.2d at 401.
46. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).
47. Id.

48. Id. Justice Romiti dissented: "I am unable to discern how the parent-child

tort immunity doctrine does not apply to the facts of the instant case ...

I am

unable to discern how the plaintiff here will be able to prove upon remand that a
mother's driving her child (or children) to eat dinner at a restaurant does not
constitute a 'family purpose."' Id. 473 N.E.2d at 405. (Romiti, J., dissenting).
49. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 I11.App. 3d 683, 686, 504 N.E.2d 920, 922
(1st Dist. 1987).
50. Id.

51. Id. at 687, 504 N.E.2d at 922.
52. Id.
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decided the specific issue now before them. 3 The second issue concerned whether the court would be bound by its prior recognition of
the immunity doctrine in Stallman J.54
The Stallman II court determined that the Illinois Supreme Court
had never specifically ruled on this particular issue." Furthermore,
the appellate court concluded that the Illinois Supreme Court had
never adopted the immunity doctrine.5 6 Finally, the court determined
that it was not bound to follow its prior recognition of the doctrine.57
Accordingly, the appellate court declared that it was free to reconsider
the continuing appropriateness of the parental immunity doctrine.5"
The Stallman II court first reviewed the history of parental
immunity and the rationales used to support the rule, emphasizing
that other jurisdictions had abandoned the doctrine.5 9 In its review,
the appellate court recited the numerous exceptions that the Illinois
appellate courts had created to limit the application of the rule. 60

53. Id. at 688, 504 N.E.2d at 922-23. The appellate court stated that this issue
needed to be addressed because "where our Supreme Court has declared Illinois law
on any point, that court alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion; such a
decision binds all other judicial tribunals of this State, and it is the duty of those
tribunals to follow such a decision in similar cases." Id. (citing Agricultural Transportation Assoc., v. Carpenter, 2 Ill. 2d 19, 27, 116 N.E.2d 863, 867 (1953); Slopka
v. Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 326, 402 N.E.2d 781, 783 (1980)).
54. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 689, 504 N.E.2d 923 (1987).
55. Id. at 688, 504 N.E.2d at 923. The court stated that the Illinois Supreme
court had merely acknowledged the rule's existence and modified it to not preclude
claims of wanton parental conduct. (citing Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 808, 131
N.E.2d 525 (1956)).
56. Id. But see Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., v. Turner, 83 Ill. App. 3d
234, 235-36, 403 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (2d Dist. 1980), for a contrary analysis to this
interpretation.
57. The appellate court noted two exceptions to the rule that where the evidence
on a subsequent appeal is the same as the evidence on the former appeal, the rulings
of the prior appeal becomes the law of the case. Stallman II, 152 Il. App. 3d at
689, 504 N.E.2d at 923 (citing Hammer v. Slive, 35 Il1. App. 2d 447, 450, 183 N.E.2d
49, 50 (1962)). The Stallman II court found that the second exception allowed it not
to be bound by its prior recognition of the doctrine. The second exception permits
an appellate court to determine that its initial decision was erroneous, but only where
the case was remanded for a new trial on all the issues. The Stallman II court
concluded that the second exception applied because its initial ruling in Stallman I
reviewed only the legal sufficiency of Lindsay's complaint. The court, therefore,
remanded the case for factual determination, and gave both parties the opportunity
to establish a new record. Id. at 689, 504 N.E.2d at 924.
58. Id. at 689, 504 N.E.2d at 924.
59. Id. at 690, 504 N.E.2d at 924.
60. Id. at 690-91, 504 N.E.2d at 924-25.

1991:409]

STALLMAN

V. YOUNGQUIST

Finally, with reference to modern public policy considerations, the

court abrogated the parental immunity 6 doctrine in toto within the
context of automobile driver negligence. '

In support of its holding, the Stallman II court confronted the
primary justifications for the doctrine, and found them to be outdated
and inappropriate for modern society. 62 The rationales of preserving

family harmony, 63 supporting parental authority, 64 and avoiding col-

lusive claims65 were analyzed and forcefully rejected. In doing so, the
court explained that its holding did not create a new legal duty, but
merely removed the barrier of parental immunity in the automobile
driver negligence context. 6 Indeed, the Stallman II court merely
acknowledged that, in Illinois, a child can recover from third parties
placed the mother in the
for negligent prenatal injuries, and simply
67
same position as any other defendant.
It can be inferred that because of the appellate court's insistence
that no new legal duty had been created by its holding, an analysis
61. Id. at 691-92, 504 N.E.2d at 925.
62. Id.

63. Id. at 693, 504 N.E.2d at 925. The court emphasized that if there was to
be any disruption of family peace, it would be the result of the tortious conduct
resulting in the injury, not the lawsuit subsequently brought to redress the injury. In
rejecting the preservation of family harmony as a viable justification, the court
observed that the availability of automobile liability insurance would mitigate family
disruption. The court explained that the suit following the injury would not be
between the parent and the child, but rather the child against the parent's insurance
company. The court concluded: "Far from being a potential source of disharmony,
the action is more likely to preserve the family unit in pursuit of a common goal the easing of family financial difficulties stemming from the child's injuries." Id. at
692-93, 504 N.E.2d at 926.
64. Id. Because the Stallman II court limited its holding to the automobile
driver negligence setting, it reasoned that parental authority would not be undermined.
Id. at 693, 504 N.E.2d at 926.
65. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 693, 504 N.E.2d 920, 926
(1st Dist. 1987). The Stallman II court recognized the difficulties in avoiding collusive
claims between the parent and the child to obtain insurance money. However, the
court stated that both the jury system and the resources of the insurance company
would be effective in deterring unjustified recovery. The court concluded: "[s]ome
collusive claims may succeed. But this does not justify a blanket denial of recovery
for all minors. It would be unjust to bar arbitrarily the claim of injured minors
desrving of relief because some cases may involve possible collusion between two
parties." Id. (citing Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 769, 611 P.2d 135,
142 (1980)).
66. Stallman v. Youngquist, 142 Ill. App. 3d, 683, 694, 504 N.E.2d 924, 926
(1987).
67. Id. at 694, 504 N.E.2d at 927.
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of the ramifications of its decision to allow a fetus, subsequently born
alive, to maintain a cause of action against its mother for negligent
prenatal injuries, was unwarranted. Implicit in the appellate court's
holding, however, is the creation of a new maternal duty, and the
court's failure to address the serious implications of such a duty was
its greatest weakness. Had the Stallman II court undertaken the type
of analysis displayed by the Illinois Supreme Court on appeal, an
appreciation of the dangers of imposing maternal prenatal civil liability might have been more fully realized.
In its conclusion, the Stallman II court noted that a Michigan
appellate court had recently ruled in Grodin v. Grodin" that a mother
bears the same liability as would any third party for negligently
inflicted prenatal injuries. 69 Grodin was the first United States decision
to impose civil liability on a mother for her negligent acts during
pregnancy. However, because the Stallman II court only noted the
holding in Grodin without discussing its facts or rationales, it is
apparent that the case was not significant support for the Stallman II
court's reasoning. Despite the apparent insignificance of Grodin to
the Stallman II court's holding, the facts and rationales of Grodin
merit discussion for two reasons. First, the Grodin decision now
stands alone as the only case which has successfully recognized
maternal prenatal civil liability. Second, the Illinois Supreme Court
in Stallman v. Youngquist vigorously attacked the Grodin court's
analysis .70
In Grodin, the child plaintiff through his father as next friend,
brought an action against his mother for negligent infliction of
prenatal injuries which allegedly resulted in the child's permanently
discolored teeth. 71 The child argued that his mother was negligent in
failing to inform her physician that she was taking the drug tetracycline during pregnancy which the child argued was the proximate
cause of his injury.72 The trial court granted the defendant mother's
motion for summary judgment holding that the child's cause of action
was barred by an exception to Michigan's generally abrogated parental
immunity doctrine. 73
68. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
69. Id. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
70. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
71. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 398, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
72. Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869-70.
73. Id. In Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 199, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972), the
Michigan Supreme Court abrogated the parental immunity doctrine but left two
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The appellate court reversed and recognized the child's cause of
action.7 4 The court stated that Michigan law recognized a child's right
to begin life with a sound mind and body and when the conduct of
another interferes with that right, the child may recover." The appellate court relied on the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Womack
v. Buckhorn,7 6 which allowed recovery for unintentional infliction of
prenatal injuries from third parties. The language in Womack stated
that a child could recover for the tortious conduct of "another." 77
The appellate court, therefore, reasoned that Womack did not preclude maternal liability for negligent prenatal injuries. 7 Thus, the
Grodin court concluded that a mother could bear the same liability
79
for negligent infliction of prenatal injuries as could any third party.
The Stallman II court, finding that the parental immunity doctrine was outdated and noting without analyzing that its decision
recognizing maternal prenatal civil liability was not without persuasive
authority, reversed the circuit court's judgment. Defendant Bari Stallman appealed the appellate court's decision and the Illinois Supreme
Court granted the request for review.8 0
III.

BEFORE THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate
court holding that "[a] cause of action by a fetus against its mother
for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries is denied."', The
supreme court was faced with two issues on appeal: (1) the status of
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine; and (2) a mother's tort
exceptions where the doctrine still applied: (1) where the alleged negligent act involved
an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged
negligent act involved an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing and medical and dental services and other
care. Id. at 203, 199 N.W.2d at 172-73. The trial court in Grodin found that the
second exception to Michian's generally abrogated parental immunity doctrine barred
the plaintiff child's cause of action. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301
N.W.2d 869, 879 (1981).
74. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
75. Id. at 397, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
76. 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
77. Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
78. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 398, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1981).
79. Id.

80. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
81. Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
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liability for negligent prenatal injuries to her child born live.82 For
reasons to be explained below, 83 the court stated that its decision to
deny Lindsay's cause of action by rejecting maternal prenatal civil
liability as a valid cause of action rendered the need to address the
84
parental immunity issue unnecessary.
After summarizing the facts and procedural history of the Stallman case, the court stated that the issue of whether a mother can be
held civilly liable for negligent prenatal injuries to her child born alive
was one of first impression for the court.8" The court, therefore,
embarked upon a review of the closest available precedent - the tort
liability for negligent prenatal injuries as it developed with respect to
third parties.
The court began by noting that the first decision in the United
States to confront the issue of whether a third party could be held
86
liable for prenatal injuries, Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northampton,
was answered in the negative, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, then a member of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the
court held that no civil duty was owed to one not yet in being. This
holding was based upon the theory that a fetus was simply a part of
its mother and was not a separate entity until severed at birth. 87 After
the Dietrich decision, and until 1946,88 all states agreed that no cause
of action would lie for negligent prenatal injuries. 8 9
In Illinois, this rule was first adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,90 where the court reaffirmed
82. Id. at 268, 531 N.E.2d at 355.
83. See infra notes 114, 115 and accompanying text.
84. Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 268, 531 N.E.2d at 355.
85. Id. at 275, 531 N.E.2d at 357.
86. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). Dietrich involved a wrongful death action brought on
behalf of a child who was born prematurely because of injuries the mother sustained
when she fell on the defendant's defective highway. The child exhibited motion in its
limbs for approximately ten to fifteen minutes after birth and then died. Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). Justice Holmes' holding that
no civil duty was owed to one not yet in being was based upon the lack of common
law precedent, the remoteness of the injury from the tortious conduct, and Holmes'
adoption of the idea that a child in utero was solely a part of the mother. Therefore,
Holmes concluded that the child could not have standing before the court because at
the time of the injury, the child was solely a part of its mother. Id. at 17.
87. Id.
88. In 1946, the Dietrich rule, which had set the pattern of development for

the American common law of prenatal injuries for 62 years without exception, was
finally rejected in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
89. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 271, 531 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1988).

90. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). In Allaire, the plaintiff, a minor, brought
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the theory that a fetus had no independent legal existence apart from
its mother. 9' The supreme court in Stallman noted that Allaire was
primarily remembered for its influential dissent by Justice Boggs: 92
"Should compensation for his injuries be denied on a mere theory known to be false - that the injury was not to his person, but to the
person of the mother?" 93
The court continued by positing that these early jurisdictional
blanket denials had been overruled. 94 In the 1946 decision, Bonbrest
v. Kotz, 95 the District Court for the District of Colombia was the first
court to explicitly reject the reasoning in Dietrich and recognize the
right of a child, negligently injured as a fetus, to recover from third
parties. In 1953, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically overruled
Allaire in Amman v. Faidy,96 finding that the rationales underlying
an action for damages for prenatal injuries sustained as a viable fetus when his
mother was a passenger in an elevator which plaintiff alleged had been negligently
operated by the defendant's servants. The Allaire majority, following the Dietrich
rule, denied the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. at 3687, 56 N.E. at 640.
91. Id. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640. The majority opinion stated: "That a child
before birth, is, in fact, a part of the mother and is only severed from birth, cannot,
we think, be successfully disputed." Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 368,
56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900).
92. The following cases relied on this dissent as a basis for reversing the
Dietrich rule: Damasiewicz v. Forsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
93. Allaire, 184 Ill. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Justice Boggs
believed that the theory that a fetus was solely a part of its mother until severed at
birth ignored proven medical fact:
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated that at a period
in gestation in advance of the period of parturition the foetus [sic] is capable
of independent and separate life, and that though within the body of the
mother it is not merely a part of her body, for her body may die in all of
its parts and the child remain alive and capable of maintaining life, when
separated from the dead body of the mother.
Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641. Justice Boggs concluded his dissent with a statement
which anticipated the direction the law would take nearly fifty years later:
The law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a child in utero is so far
advanced in prenatal age as that, should parturition by natural or artificial
means occur at such age, such child could and would live separable from
the mother, and grow into the ordinary activities of life, and is afterwards
born, and becomes a living being, such child has a right of action for any
injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such age
of viability, though then in the womb of the mother.
Id. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642.
2d 267, 272, 531 N.E. 2d 355, 357 (1988).
94. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill.
95. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
96. 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1963).
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the prohibition on liability were no longer persuasive. 97 The supreme
court in Stallman commented that "[tihe rule recognizing the right to
bring an action for injuries inflicted on a fetus by a person not its
mother is as pervasive and established now as the contrary rule
before .

"..."98

Continuing its review of third party liability, the supreme court
explained that Illinois initially relied upon the viability of a fetus as
a measuring point by which it could be determined with certainty that
a fetus and its mother were separate entities. 99 Therefore, actions for
prenatal injuries inflicted prior to viability were rejected.' °° The requirement of viability, however, was dramatically overruled two decades later by the Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital.0' In Renslow, the defendant hospital and physician negligently transfused a thirteen year old girl twice with incompatible
blood. The girl became sensitized by the transfusions, but only became
aware of it as an adult and only after she became pregnant. As a
result of the negligent transfusions, her child, the plaintiff, was born
with permanent damage to the brain and central nervous system. 0 2
The issue in Renslow was whether "a child, not conceived at the
time negligent acts were committed against its mother, [has] a cause
of action against the tortfeasors for its injuries resulting from their
conduct."1 3 Answering in the affirmative, the Renslow court not only
removed viability as a requirement for recovery, but also extended
the scope of liability for negligent acts prior to conception.°4
The Illinois Supreme Court in Renslow recognized preconception
negligence actions on two grounds. First, the supreme court held that
the defendants had a "contingent prospective duty" to the child born

97. Id. at 423, 114 N.E.2d at 416. The court articulated the three primary
reasons why recovery had heretofore been denied: (1) lack of precedent; (2) the
difficulties in proving the causal relationship between the injury and the harm; and
(3) the absence of a duty towards the unborn child. The court countered there
arguments by reasoning: (1) fetal rights were recognized to a limited extent in will
and inheritance cases; (2) difficulties in establishing a causal link should not preclude
a remedy; and (3) that the fetus had a separate existence a part from its mother was
a demonstrable fact. Id.
98. Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 272, 531 N.E.2d at 357.

99. Id. at 273, 531 N.E.2d at 357.
100. See, e.g., Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 245 (1962).
101. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
102. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 II1.2d 348, 349-50, 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1251 (1977).
103. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
104. Id. at 348, 367 N.E.2d at 1250.
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in the future. °5 Second, blood typing had been an established procedure for fifteen years. Because the medical community recognized
that an incompatible transfusion was a "high risk," the child's injury
was foreseeable. 10 6
Because the holding in Renslow had no precedent in Illinois, the
court discussed in detail the ideas of foreseeability and duty. The
majority explained that while foreseeability is useful in determining
the negligence of a particular party, the question of duty was a legal
question which was to be determined by the court. 0 7 In support of
its holding that the defendants owed a "contingent prospective duty"
to the plaintiff, the Renslow majority asserted that 'duty' is not
sacrosanct in itself, but [is] only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which leave the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."10
A powerful dissent proffered by Justice Ryan criticized the
majority's analysis. Justice Ryan believed that while the majority
spoke in terms of foreseeability, its decision could only be understood
as an anlysis which rested almost exclusively upon causation as the
foundation of duty. 1 9 This approach, Justice Ryan argued, ignored
Professor Prosser's approach in determining duty which rested on
judicial determination of the community's mores." I0 Furthermore,
Justice Ryan accused the majority of judicial activism and of thoughtlessly expanding traditional limits of tort liability,"' remarking that
the Renslow decision was one more "logical" step toward absolute
liability." 2 The majority responded to this assertion by declaring that
the judiciary would "effectively exercise its traditional role of drawing
rational distinctions . . .between harms which are compensable and
those which are not"" 3 in an appropriate case in the future.
The supreme court's review of the case law concerning the
development of recovery for negligent prenatal injuries implicity
demonstrates that prenatal tort liability has expanded dramatically
and, in most instances, logically. The court appears to have used this
105. Id. at 355-59, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-55.
106. Id. at 353-54, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
107. Id. at 367-69, 367 N.E.2d at 1260.
108. Id. at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW O TORTS, sec.
53 at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971)).
109. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.
2d 348, 375, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1263
(1977) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 378, 367 N.E.2d at 1265.
112. Id. at 377, 367 N.E.2d at 1265.
113. Id. at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
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closest available precedent precisely to distinguish it by emphasizing
one crucial difference: recovery for tortious prenatal injuries involved
actions where the defendant was a third party and not the mother of
the plaintiff."1 4 This was a critical distinction for the Stallman court.
The analysis of the foregoing case law, first articulated in Bonbrest,"5 indicated that a fetus was a separate entity from its mother
insofar as injury to the mother could result in injury to the fetus.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that this type of analysis was
inapplicable to the facts of Stallman because of the unique, symbiotic
relationship between a mother and her fetus. This unique relationship
16
distinguished the mother from any other third party defendant.,
This distinction was also the basis for the supreme court's vigorous attack on the Michigan appellate court decision, Grodin v.
Grodin."7 According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Grodin court
failed to realize that recognizing that a fetus' cause of action against
its mother for negligent prenatal injuries was a separate and distinct
question from the application of Michigan's generally abrogated
parent-child tort immunity doctrine." 8 The distinction lay in the
serious ramifications of holding a mother potentially liable for her
every act during pregnancy. The court explained that the Grodin
decision would have the effect of treating the pregnant mother as "a
stranger to her developing fetus.""19 Therefore, the supreme court
concluded that "the Grodin court failed to address any of the
profound implications which would result from such a legal fiction
20
and is, for that reason, unpersuasive."'
The court then commenced into the heart of the Stallman opinion.
The court noted that in the course of development of third party
liability for tortious prenatal injuries, some courts had announced
that the fetus had a "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body."' 2' The court explained that this right was promulgated to
emphasize that a third party's duty of care was not owed solely to
the mother. Rather, the duty extended to a fetus who could also be

114. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 11. 2d 267, 274, 531 N.E.2d 355, 358 (1988).
115. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).

116. Stallman, 125 Il.2d at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.

117. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1981).
118. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 274, 531 N.E.2d 355, 358 (1988).
119. Id.
120. Id.

121. Id. at 275, 531 N.E.2d at 358 (citing Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927

(Okla. 1976); Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222
(1971); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364-65, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960)).
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harmed by tortious conduct. 1' The court found untenable, however,
the proposition that the legal right to be born with a sound mind and
body, if accepted, could be assertable at birth by a child against its
mother for negligent prenatal injuries. To do so, the court explained,
would necessarily impose a heretofore unrecognized legal duty on the
mother to provide the best possible prenatal care. 23 This would have
the inevitable effect of making the pregnant mother the insurer of the
mind and body of the child at birth, and would result in the creation
24
of a new tort.'
The court further explained why it would not recognize a mother's
legal duty to her fetus. The supreme court in Stallman conceded that
"[i]t is foreseeable that any act or omission by a pregnant woman
could impact on fetal development."' ' 2 However, in an implicit ratification of the reasoning of Justice Ryan's dissent in Renslow, the
court explained that foreseeability alone was insufficient to establish
a legal duty.126 In agreement with Professor Prosser, the court indicated that causation alone was also an inadequate ground for the
imposition of a duty. 27 Accordingly, even where an injury was
foreseeable and causation substantiated, the Stallman court would be
unwilling to impose a duty automatically without first examining
public policy considerations.
Furthermore, the court declared that if a legal duty to her fetus
was to be imposed upon the mother, the courts would be required to
develop a judicially defined standard of care for all pregnant women. 2
The supreme court in Stallman recognized two inherent difficulties in
formulating such a standard. The first difficulty focused on formu122. Stallman, 125 I11.
2d at 275, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
123. Id. at 275-76, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
124. Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
125. Id. at 277, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
126. Id.at 277, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
127. Id.
128. Id.In attempting to define the standard of care, the court stated:
It must be asked, By what judicially defined standard would a mother have
her every act or omission while pregnant subjected to State scrutiny? By
what objective standard could a jury be guided in determining whether a
pregnant woman did all that was necessary in order not to breach a legal
duty not to interfere with her fetus' separate and independent right to be
born whole? In what way would prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs about
the reproductive capacities of women be kept from interfering with a jury's
determination of whether a particular woman was negligent at any point
during her pregnancy?
Id.at 277-78, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
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lating an appropriate standard of care for the myriad of women who
would fall within this classification. 29 The second difficulty focused
on the simple reality that everything a mother does or does not do
necessarily impacts upon the fetus she is carrying. 30
In addressing the first problem of developing an appropriate
standard of care to effectuate the new legal duty if imposed upon
expectant mothers, the court noted that any judicially defined standard
of care would be complicated by the presence of the myriad of women
from different social, economic, and educational backgrounds on
whom the duty would be imposed.' The court emphasized that not
all women who become pregnant have the ability or means to provide
the best possible prenatal environment for their fetus. 13 2 Furthermore,
the court noted that any woman of sufficient biological maturity was
capable of becoming pregnant.' 33 Although the court did not explain
the significance of this particular statement, the court is perhaps
implying that a young female could become pregnant but not understand the standard of care that is required of her or that a different
standard of care might have to be applied to adolescent mothers.
Turning to address the second problem, the court confronted the
controversial issue of whether the interests of the fetus should or
should not prevail over the privacy rights of the mother. The court
recognized that fetal rights proponents hold the belief that a woman
should subordinate her interests to those of her fetus upon becoming
pregnant. 3 4 The court also recognized that many of these advocates
believe that any act a pregnant woman may do which entails a risk
of harm to the developing fetus should be proscribed through civil or
criminal sanctions.'35 The court reasoned that because anything a
pregnant woman does impacts the developing fetus, for good or for
ill, a woman could be held liable for any act or omission on her part
during pregnancy upon the birth of the child. 3 6 The court considered
that while this outcome would be consistent with the beliefs of those
who placed the interests of the fetus above the rights of the mother, 137

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

279, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
279, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
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the court concluded that "such is not and cannot be the law of this
State." 138
The court continued its analysis by suggesting that there were
significant public policy issues at stake in its decision, and that an
imposition of a new legal duty and the necessary formulation of a
standard of care flowing from that duty would have "far reaching"
implications. 3 9 The court implied that the judicial forum was illequipped to address these issues, concluding that if such a duty were
to be recognized "the decision must come from the legislature only
after thorough investigation, study and debate."14°
Central to the supreme court's analysis in Stallman was its focus
on the relationship between a mother and her developing fetus. The
court considered this relationship to be so unique that it was unlike
the relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant.1 4' The
court stressed that: "No other plaintiff depends exclusively on any
other defendant for everything necessary for life itself. No other
defendant must go through biological changes of the most profound
type, possibly at the risk of her own life, to bring forth an adversary
1 42
into this world.'
The court's appreciation of the biological fact that the reproductive capacity of the human species necessarily falls upon individual
pregnant women suggested that recognizing the plaintiff's cause of
action would be impractical. The court stated that it was not the fault
of the mother but rather a fact of life that every moment of a
pregnant woman's life impacts the environment of the developing
fetus. 43 The dependency of the fetus on the mother for life itself
definitively distinguishes the mother from any third party defendant,
and further influenced the court not to impose maternal prenatal civil
liability.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
140. Id. at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 360. The court listed several practical problems
courts would face in applying the standard of care. Essentially, these difficulties
centered around whether the standard should vary to fit the factual circumstances of
the particular case. For example, the court questioned whether the standard should
vary if: (1) the pregnancy was planned or unplanned; (2) the woman was aware of
the pregnancy after conception or only became aware of the pregnancy weeks or
months after intercourse; and (3) the woman had adequate financial means to obtain
the best possible prenatal care or if the woman was unable to secure such care. Id.
141. Id. at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
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The court explained that in its original conception of tort liability
of third parties to the fetus, the courts erred in treating the fetus as
solely a part of its mother.'" Although this misconception had been

corrected, the court was unwilling to make, in its opinion, an even

greater error by treating the mother and the fetus as completely
separate entities. 45 The court suggested that this error would have
"enormous implications for all women who have been, are, may be,

14 6
or might become pregnant."
The supreme court then briefly discussed those implications that
would result if the plaintiff's cause of action were to be recognized.
The court first compared the effect of holding a third party liable to
the child for tortious prenatal injuries with that of holding a mother
liable. The court explained that holding a third party liable for such
injuries advanced both the interests of the mother and the fetus
without significantly impairing the right of the defendant to have
control over his or her own life.1 47 To hold the mother liable, on the
other hand, "subjects to State scrutiny all the decisions a mother
must make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to term, and infringes
148
on her right of privacy and bodily autonomy.
Mindful that the imposition of maternal prenatal civil liability
would inevitably lead to "[j]udicial scrutiny into the day-to-day lives
of pregnant women [and] would involve an unprecedented intrusion
into the privacy and autonomy of the citizens of this state,"', 49 the
court rejected the plaintiff's cause of action. With reference to the
majority's assertion in Renslow, 50 the court declared that it was
performing its 'traditional role in drawing rational distinctions'
between compensable and noncompensable injuries.''
The court concluded its opinion by stating:
In holding that no cause of action will lie for maternal prenatal
negligence, this court emphasizes that we in no way minimize
the public policy favoring healthy newborns. Pregnant women
need access to information about the risk inherent in every
day living on a developing fetus and need access to health care

for themselves and their developing fetuses . . . The way to
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
at 276-77, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
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effectuate the birth of healthy babies is not, however, through
after-the-fact civil liability in tort for individual mothers, but
rather through before-the-fact education of all women and
2
their families about prenatal development.1
There were no dissenting opinions.

IV.

ANALYsis

"The bodies of pregnant women are the battleground on which
the campaign to define the right of privacy is fought. "I" A small
part of this campaign was waged in Stallman: the interests of the
fetus in being born with a sound mind and body were pitted against
a pregnant woman's right to personal autonomy and bodily integrity.
The Illinois Supreme Court resolved this conflict in favor of the
privacy rights of the mother over the interests of the fetus after
weighing these competing claims and assessing the implications of an
opposite conclusion.
Although the supreme court in Stallman rejected maternal prenatal civil liability by analyzing a number of issues, explicit in the
court's opinion are three conclusions which could prove favorable to
a woman's privacy rights in future settings. First, the court concluded
that a fetus cannot be deemed a separate entity, completely independent from its mother. 5 4 Second, a fetus does not have a legal right to
be born with a sound mind and body which can be asserted against
its mother at birth.' Third, absent such a right, the court concluded
that a mother does not owe a legal duty to her fetus to provide the
56
best possible prenatal care.
The Stallman decision clearly safeguards the privacy rights of
women in the narrow setting of tort liability. The court, however, did
not specifically address the companion issue of state intervention
57
during pregnancy to protect the fetus from maternal conduct.
Moreover, the court expressly invited the legislature to examine the
152. Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
153. Annas, Predicting the Future of Privacy in Pregnancy: How Medical
Technology Affects the Legal Rights of Pregnant Women, 13 NOVA L. REv. 329,
329 (1989).
154. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Il.

155. Id. at 277, 531 N.E.2d at 359.

2d 267, 277, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988).

156. Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.

157. For a discussion of this topic, see, e.g., Comment, The Fetal Patient and

the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for Judicial Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065

(1983). See generally, Trammel, FetalRights - A Bibliography, 10 N. ILL. U.L. REv.

70 (1988).
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issue whether a legal duty to a fetus should be imposed on its
mother.' 58
Despite these shortcomings, the court did articulate some of the
dangers of imposing maternal prenatal civil liability by emphasizing
the negative ramifications of excessive state intrusion into the everyday
lives of women. Finally, the court suggested that social programs
focusing on prenatal care would be more effective in promoting fetal
well-being than after-the-fact litigation to deter negative maternal
conduct.'5 9 The intertwined issues which provided the framework of
the Stallman opinion will now be examined in detail.
A.

A MOTHER'S LEGAL DUTY TO HER FETUS

The Stallman court expressly rejected the proposition that a
mother owes a legal duty to her fetus.' 60 The court recognized that a
duty does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, traditional tort law demands
a relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant from which a duty
cognizable right which the
emerges. 161 The plaintiff must have some
62
defendant is under a duty to protect.1
The increasingly articulated right in prenatal negligence settings
is the right of a fetus to be born with a sound mind and body. The
first court to recognize this right was the New Jersey Supreme Court
in its 1960 decision, Smith v. Brennan:
Justice requires that the principle be recognized that a child
has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body. If
the wrongful conduct of another interferes with that right,
and it can be established by competent proof that there is a
causal connection between the wrongful interference and the
harm suffered by the child when born, damages for such harm
63
should be recoverable by the child.'
This formulation, however, significantly expands the existing recognized duties owed a fetus.' 64
158. Stallman, 125 Il1.2d at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See W.

KEETON, supra note

162. Id. at 357.

2 sec. 53 at 356 (5th ed. 1984).

163. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364-65, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).

164. See Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986)

for a discussion of the process by which the courts have expanded the traditional
rights of fetuses and the danger this poses to a woman's constitutional rights.
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Every state now recognizes a cause of action for prenatal injuries
with respect to third parties.' 65 Generally, two conditions must be met
before the courts will award recovery for prenatal harm: (1) that the
child be born alive;'6 and (2) that the child's condition be worsened
by a breach of duty owed to the fetus by the defendant. 67 If a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body is accepted, "there
must also be a corresponding duty to ensure the desired outcome, and
any violation of that duty would be wrongful even if it did not worsen
the child's condition."'"
The duty to insure that a child begins life with a sound mind and
body, if imposed upon a pregnant woman, suggests that a mother
could be liable for her prenatal conduct in an infinite variety of
circumstances. The theoretical groundwork for imposing such liability
has already be laid by fetal rights proponents.16 9 For example, one
commentator has suggested that damages could be awarded for the
165. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a review.
166. Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Intervention in PrenatalChoice, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 19, 25 (1985).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 26.
169. For a discussion on imposing maternal prenatal civil liability as well as
criminal liability upon women for their maternal conduct, see Bross & Meredyth,
Neglect of the Unborn Child: An Analysis Based on Law in the United States, 3
CHImD ABUSE & NEGLECT 643 (1979) (authors favor medical and legal intervention
when necessary to halt potential prenatal abuse); Note, Developing MaternalLiability
Standards for PrenatalInjury, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 592 (1987) (author concludes
that pregnant women have a duty to protect the health of their fetuses and that civil
liability should be imposed to effectuate that duty); Doudera, Fetal Rights? It
Depends, 18 TRIAL 38 (Apr. 1982) (author indicates that the fetus should be provided
the same protections afforded to newborns even if by doing so a woman's privacy
rights are interefered with); King, The Judicial Status of the Fetus: A Proposalfor
Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MIcH. L. Rv. 1647 (1979) (author proposes that
the same protections guaranteed to newborns should be afforded to viable fetuses);
Comment, Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There a Limit? 6 FoDIHAM URB.
L.J. 217 (1977) (author concludes that preconception negligence should be a viable
cause of action); Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal
Protectionfor the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209 (1987) (author recommends that
the mother's conduct must be circumscribed to protect the fetus); Parness, The Abuse
and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting PotentialHuman Life, 20 FAM. L.Q.
197 (1986) (author suggests that legislatures should expand criminal and tort liability
to protect against prenatal injuries); Robertson, Reconciling Offspring and Maternal
Interests During Pregnancy in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s 259 (S. Cohen &
N. Taub eds. 1989) (author suggests that state intervention during pregnancy may be
necessary to protect the fetus); Shaw, ConditionalProspective Rights of the Fetus, 5
J. LEoAL MED. 63 (1984) (author concludes that whatever steps are necessary to
protect the fetus should be taken).
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following maternal prenatal conduct: malnutrition, ingestion of prescription and non-prescription drugs (including aspirin), ingestion of
illegal narcotics, smoking, drinking alcohol, exposure to infectious
diseases, unwarranted use of amniocenteses, immoderate70 exercise and
sexual intercourse during the last month of pregnancy.'
Medical science has indeed determined that these activities can
impact the fetus negatively.17 ' This list, however, is by no means
exhaustive of the potential claims against mothers. The list also
demonstrates that there is no real rational stopping point in the types
of claims that can be brought if the duty to insure that a child begins
life with a sound mind and body is imposed.
Clearly, many of the activities mentioned in the list can foreseeably impact the developing fetus negatively. The Stallman court,
however, rejected foreseeability as a sole basis for the imposition of
a mother's legal duty to her fetus. 72 Furthermore, liability for these
types of maternal conduct "touches upon the most personal kinds of
behavior, including the sexual relationship with her spouse or lover,
not just what she does in public or at work, [the list] leaves little
room for a mother's own needs and natural desires and preferences.' 1 73 The Stallman court correctly perceived the dangers to a
woman's right to personal autonomy in the event such a duty were
imposed. These dangers distinguish the mother from a third party
defendant whose right to personal autonomy is not significantly
impaired by the prospects of liability. 174
The Stallman court also reasonably perceived the difficulties of
establishing when a mother's duty of care to her fetus would commence if the right of a fetus to begin life with a sound mind and
body were recognized. The court stated that whether a pregnancy was
planned or unplanned or whether a mother knew she was pregnant
soon after conception or weeks later were factors suggesting that the
commencement of a mother's duty would be varied. 75 This could lead
76
to inequitable results.
170. Simon, Parental Responsibility for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.

PROBS. 47, 48 (1978).

171. See Beal, supra note 7, at 362.
172. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Il. 2d 267, 277-80, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359-61

(1988).
173. King, Should Mom Be Constrained in the Best Interests of the Fetus? 13
NOVA L.J. 393, 397 (1989).

174. Stallman, 125 II1. 2d at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
175. Id. at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
176. See infra notes 180, 181 and accompanying text.
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The court's opinion could have been strengthened by a more
thorough analysis of this complication. One commentator, Professor
Ron Beal, carefully analyzed the complex problems with the commencement of a maternal duty.' 77 Beal noted that medical knowledge
has determined that the greatest danger to fetal well-being lies in the
first trimester of pregnancy.' 78 Beal, however, also noted that a woman
cannot be reliably informed of her pregnancy until weeks after
conception ' 79 Beal suggested that a "standard which assumes a woman
knows when she has conceived may result in the imposition on a
woman to use care in the treatment of her body long before conception
actually occurs."180
If, however, the standard imposed a duty of care on a woman
only when she had actual knowledge of her pregrancy, the result is
equally problematic. Given the length of time before a woman can be
reliably informed of her pregnancy, an "actual knowledge" standard
suggests that a woman could act with impunity towards her fetus at
precisely the same time where the fetus is most susceptible to injury.'8 '
Developing the appropriate standard for the commencement of duty
would be further complicated in Illinois because this state recognizes
preconception tort liability of third parties. 8 2 If a pregnant woman
was held to such a standard, "the conduct of her entire lifetime prior
to the conception of her child . . . could result in legal liability."'8 3
This result is unreasonable and unacceptable.
177. See Beal, supra note 7, at 364.
178. Id. at 359.
179. Id. at 365. Beal also mentions that there are several psychological factors
which inhibit a woman from going to a physician to determine if she is pregnant.
These factors include: the fear of the unknown, the fear of a painful delivery, the
fear of death, the fear of economic hardship resulting from the pregnancy, a feeling
of resentment over the loss of independence and attractiveness, anxiety that a child
would compete with her for her husband's love, and uncertainty about the parental
role. Id. (citing R. BENSON, HANDBOOK OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 447-48 (7th
ed. 1980)).
180. See Beal, supra note 7, at 364-65.
181. Id. at 366.
182. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
Ironically, the Renslow decision prompted one commentator to advocate the imposition of maternal prenatal civil liability. See Comment, Preconception Torts: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 621, 639 (1977). For an analysis and
discussion of preconception tort liability, see Comment, Recognizing a Cause of
Action for Preconception Torts in Light of Medical and Legal Advancements
Regarding the Unborn, 53 UMKC L. REv. 78 (1984); Comment, Preconception Torts:
A Look At Our Newest Class of Litigants, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 97 (1978); Note,
Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REv. 706 (1977).
183. See Beal, supra note 7, at 368.
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The Stallman court was aware of these difficulties.'8 Moreover,
the court clearly expressed that the duty under consideration was a
legal duty and not a moral one. 85 It is probably safe to assume that
most people would agree that a pregnant woman has a moral obligation to promote the well-being of her fetus. Mindful of the ramifications and potential sanctions of a recognized legal duty and its
breach, however, the court sensibly suggested that if such a duty were
86
to ever be imposed, the decision must come from the legislature.
B.

THE STANDARD OF CARE

The Stallman court perceived difficulties in formulating a judicially defined standard of care to measure maternal prenatal conduct
if a legal duty was imposed on a mother to protect the interests of
the fetus.8 7 The difficulty in formulating such a standard was complicated by the presence of the myriad of women who would fall
within this classification. This classification of pregnant women would
necessarily encompass all socioeconomic categories including the rich,
the poor, educated and ignorant.' 8 8 Obviously, factors such as wealth
and education play an important role in a mother's ability to provide
the best possible prenatal care. Despite social, economic, and educational differences between women, justice would require that the
standard of care be fairly applied to all.
Although there were difficulties in formulating an appropriate
standard, the court did have an alternative standard available which
could have been adopted instead of deferring to the legislature. Had
the Stallman court been willing to abrogate parental immunity and to
recognize a mother's legal duty to her fetus, the court could have
adopted the "reasonable parent" standard.
Formulated by the California Supreme Court in 1971,189 the
"reasonable parent" standard asks: "what would an ordinary reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?' " 19 This
formulation employs the traditional tort standard of reasonableness
and applies it to parental conduct. The Stallman court could have
2d 267, 276, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988).
184. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill.
185. Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
186. Id. at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 360-61.
187. Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359; see also supra notes 129, 130 and accompanying text.
188. Stallman, 125 Ill.
2d at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
189. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 2d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971).
190. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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further modified the standard to apply to maternal prenatal conduct,

a "reasonable pregnant woman" standard. 9
Despite considerable scholarly support for the reasonable parent
standard, 192 only the Minnesota Supreme Court has subsequently
adopted the standard in Anderson v. Stream. 93 The thoughtful dis-

senting opinion in Anderson perhaps suggests the reasons why the

majority of jurisdictions have been unwilling to follow the California
approach.

194

The Stallman court also expressed doubts about the efficacy of

an objective standard.

95

The court questioned whether an objective

standard could guide a jury to determine whether a mother used her
best efforts not to breach her legal duty to her fetus.'9 Furthermore,
the court expressed concern that an objective standard would reinforce
prejudicial and stereotypical belief's about a woman's reproductive
191. One author specifically recommended this standard. See Note, Developing
Maternal Liability Standardsfor Prenatal Injury, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 592, 605
(1987).
192. See, e.g., Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity in Oklahoma: Some
Considerationfor Abandoning the Total Immunity Shield, 12 TULSA L. J. 545, 553
(1977); Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to ParentChild Tort Immunity, 47 U. CoLo. L. REV. 795, 808 (1976); Note, Intrafamilial Tort
Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrierto Personal Injury Litigation, 10
RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 661, 679 (1989).
193. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
194. The dissenting opinion of Justice Rogsheske in Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), argued:
First, the objective standard encourages parents to disparage the favored
American principle of freedom of choice in family matters by holding out
the possibility of an insurance recovery if a parent is willing to expose his
conduct and judgment to public scrutiny. Second, jury verdicts based on a
reasonable parent standard in this value-laden area do not inspire public
confidence, since they would necessarily substitute parental judgments based
upon the individual juror's views of proper or ideal child-rearing practices.
The tendency toward arbitrary and intrusive standards of good parenting,
which stems from the fact that most jurors have strong views in this area
due to their personal experiences as parents and children, cannot be alleviated
by precise instructions. The reasonable parent standard thus invites a
recovery-oriented parent to gamble that a jury will find him negligent.
Moreover, since the jury must consider the family context and the parent is
the best, and perhaps only, witness capable of expressing the personal,
cultural and socio-economic principles by which he raises his children, the
danger of collusion is significant.
Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602 (Minn. 1980) (Rogsheske, J., dissenting).
195. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
196. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 I11.2d 267, 278, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (1988).
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capacities which could interfere with the jury's determination of
fault. 197
The lack of jurisdictional support for the reasonable parent
standard and the practical difficulties in applying it with consistent
and unprejudicial results, suggests that the standard was not a viable
one. Because a more suitable standard was unavailable, and mindful
of the limitations of the judicial forum's capacity to formulate broad
public policy, the supreme court's decision in Stallman to defer to the
legislature was sound.
C.

THE MOTHER-FETUS RELATIONSHIP

The unique relationship between a mother and her fetus was a
crucial factor in the Stallman court's opinion, and one which was
intimately connected with the other issues under the court's examination. The court emphasized that the mother was unlike any other
defendant in the prenatal negligence setting. 98 This uniqueness was
pivotal in the court's decision to reject maternal prenatal civil liability.
The Stallman court recognized that the early common law decisions were mistaken in their theory that a fetus was solely a part of
its mother.' 99 This mistaken view was corrected by the Bonbrest v.
Kotz decision in 1946.200 The Bonbrest court held that a fetus was a
separate entity to the extent that an injury to the mother could result
20 1
in injury to the fetus.
The Stallman court viewed the symbiotic relationship between a
mother and her fetus as an inescapable biological fact. Any act or
omission by a pregnant woman necessarily has an impact upon her
fetus. The court, therefore, logically refused to view a fetus as an
entity which is completely independent from its mother. 20 2 This relationship distinguished a mother from a third party whose every waking
and sleeping moment is not intimately connected to the fetus which
he or she could potentially harm.
The court's logical conclusion that a fetus is not a completely
separate entity from its mother is a consideration that fetal rights
proponents implicitly often overlook or underemphasize. Many of
these advocates view maternal prenatal civil liability, and even criminal
sanctions, as simply the next logical step. The modern trend is to
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.

Id.at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.

See supra note 95 at 359.
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 I1. 2d 267, 276, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988).

1991:409]

STALLMAN V. YOUNGQUIST

expand fetal rights by increasing the scope of liability, and hence
recovery, for prenatal injuries. The fact that Illinois currently allows
prenatal negligence actions against third parties where the fetus is not
yet conceived at the time of the injury 2 3 aptly illustrates the lengths
to which prenatal tort liability has been expanded. This trend is
2°4
coupled with a state's interest in the potential life of a viable fetus
and the articulated right of a fetus to be born whole. 20 5 Taken together,
this progression lends credence to the claim that maternal prenatal
civil liability is the next logical step.
In response to this argument, the Stallman court stated that
"[l]ogic does not demand that a pregnant woman be treated in a
court of law as a stranger to her fetus. "' 206 Furthermore, in Renslow
v, Mennonite Hospital,20 7 the Illinois Supreme Court refused to reject
preconception tort liability despite the arguments of the Renslow
defendants that acceptance of such a cuase of action would ultimately
lead to more extensive causes of action. In response to these thoughtful
predictions, the majority opinion asserted: "We feel confident that
when such a case is presented, the judiciary will effectively exercise
its traditional role of drawing rational distinctions, consonant with
current perceptions of justice, between harms which are compensable
and those which are not." 2 8
The Illinois Supreme Court fulfilled its warning in Renslow that
the court would draw the line against the ever-expanding prenatal tort
liability in the appropriate case. Stallman was that appropriate case,
and the "rational distinction" in Stallman was the unique relationship
between a mother and her fetus. Unlike any other defendant, only a
mother's every act could render her potentially liable to her fetus at
birth. The Stallman court wisely refused to allow a mother and her
child to become legal adversaries from the moment of conception or
preconception.
D.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF MATERNAL PRENATAL CIVIL LIABILITY

The Stallman court emphasized that the imposition of a legal
duty on the mother to insure the sound mind and body of her fetus
entailed serious ramifications for a woman's right to personal autonomy. Liability for a mother's prenatal torts would result, as the court
203. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
204. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).

205. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364-65, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
206. Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
207. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).

208. Id. at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
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indicated, in excessive state intrusion into a woman's daily life and
most personal affairs. 209 Unfortunately, the court's opinion did not
detail the particular ramifications of the state intrusion. Had it done
so, the dangers of recognizing maternal prenatal civil liability would
have been made much clearer.
Fetal rights proponents maintain that maternal prenatal civil
liability would promote fetal well-being by deterring harmful maternal
conduct. 210 This outcome is doubtful. First, civil liability will not
prevent injuries to the developing fetus but merely compensate the
child for its injuries after-the-fact. Furthermore, this would only be
effective if the mother had insurance, because without insurance it is
unlikely that the suit would ever be brought. Second, it has been
suggested that maternal prenatal civil liability would not be effective
in deterring harmful maternal conduct. According to one author:
Imposing liability on a mother for her prenatal negligence
would do little to further traditional tort goals. First, it seems
unlikely that the prospects of liability would have much of a
deterrent effect because it seems doubtful that an expectant
mother would contemplate that the fetus she is carrying would
later file suit against her.21'
Would the fear of potential liability deter an alcoholic pregnant
mother from taking another drink? Unlikely. Would it deter a mother
from working a job which may be hazardous to her fetus when the
mother needs the money to support herself and her family? The
answer is probably "No." Not only would maternal prenatal civil
liability not promote fetal well-being, it may actually deter a pregnant
mother from seeking adequate prenatal care.
One commentator has recognized this danger. 2 2 The author stated
that a failure to respect a pregnant woman's autonomy in decisionmaking would burden the doctor-patient relationship:
Pregnant women would have to worry that if they disagreed
with their physicians' advice that they would be at risk of

.209. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 278-80, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360-61
(1988).
210. See, e.g., Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 47, 90 (1978); Note, Recovery for PrenatalInjuries: The Right of a Child
Against its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 609 (1976).
211. Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care,
67 VA. L. REV. 582 (1981).
212. King, supra note 173, at 403.
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court intervention . . . . If we are not careful, we might actually encourage women to avoid prenatal care. This is particularly a problem in a country that does not provide adequate
prenatal care to its women to begin with. The prospect of
penalizing women for seeking prenatal treatment, at least for
23
those who can afford it, is simply unacceptable.
This author also suggested that if legal liability became too burdensome, women may be encouraged to seek abortions rather than face
a possible civil sanction. 2 4 This is hardly a palatable outcome for
fetal rights proponents.
Excessive state intrusion into the daily lives of women in the
name of fetal well-being incorrectly supports a view that a mother
and her fetus are separate entities and reflects a position that the
interests of the two are hostile. 2"1A recognition of maternal prenatal
civil liability means that the state would become an affirmative force
in fostering an adversarial relationship between a mother and her
fetus. 216 After-the-fact liability is also destructive to a woman's prenatal decion-making autonomy by making the state a co-partner with
physicians to determine what is the proper course for prenatal health
care. 217 This usurpation is necessarily conditioned on the assumption
that the interests of the fetus and the mother are adverse, an assumption which may be detrimental to prenatal health care. As one author
stated:
When the woman has chosen not to exercise her right to abort
her fetus, she is likely to care deeply about the well-being of
the child she will bear. It is therefore more rational to assume
that women will consider potentially harmful effects to their
children resulting from their actions during pregnancy. Furthermore, because the decisions a woman makes throughout
her pregnancy depends on her individual values and preferences, complicated sets of life circumstances, and uncertain
probabilities of daily risk, the woman herself is best situated
21
to make these complex evaluations. 1
The Stallman court also recognized that a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body assertable against the mother would
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 398.
Johnsen, supra note 164 at 613.
Id.
King, supra note 173, at 403.
Johnsen, supra note 164, at 61.
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negatively impact society's perception of women and their reproductive capacities. 1 9 One effect of maternal prenatal civil liability would
be that women would be defined solely by their reproductive capacities
because their every act would be subject to state scrutiny to determine
whether they conformed to the standard of care to protect their
fetuses. To define women in this manner would perpetuate sexual
inequality because historically a woman's capacity to bear children
was precisely the basis for sexual discrimination. 220 Given that public
policy favors the elimination of sexual inequality and sexual stereotypes, this is not a desirable result. Had the Stallman court recognized
maternal prenatal civil liability, the decision may very well have been
subjected to constitutional attack.
V.

A.

IMPACT

A WOMAN'S PRIVACY RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision to reject Lindsay Stallman's
cause of action effectively safeguards a woman's privacy rights from
excessive state intrusion in the prenatal negligence setting. A pregnant
mother will continue to exercise her right to personal autonomy by
deciding, on her terms, the appropriate prenatal environment for her
fetus without fear of civil sanction. Furthermore, she will not be
defined by a legally sanctioned sexual stereotype. The Stallman court's
conclusion that the interests of the fetus were not superior to the
rights of the mother offers hope that, in future settings, courts and
legislatures will not thoughtlessly expand the rights of fetuses to the
detriment of those women who will bear them.
The cost of this decision is, of course, that a child who has been
negligently injured in utero by its mother is without a remedy with
respect to its mother. The Stallman court was well aware of this cost.
The court, however, concluded that the way to properly effectuate
fetal well-being was through social programs concentrating on prenatal
health care and not after-the-fact civil liability for a few individual
mothers. The Stallman decision may indeed influence legislatures to
formulate and enact prenatal health care programs. Given the traditionally poor financing of such programs by the state, however, this
outcome, unfortunately, seems unlikely.
B.

PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY REMAINS VIABLE IN ILLINOIS

The Staliman decision affirms that parent-child tort immunity
remains the law today in Illinois with respect to negligent torts.
219. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Il. 2d 267, 278, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (1988).

220. Johnsen, supra note 164, at 620.
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Without fuller discussion, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered: "Insofar as Stallman I and Stallman II purport to effect a change in the
the appeal
status of the parental immunity doctrine as it existed before
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vacated."
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This holding obviously renders the Stallman II court's abrogation
of parental immunity in the context of automobile driver negligence
void, but the vacation of judgments might have a much more broader
impact. As indicated earlier, the Stallman II court recognized the
222
"family purpose" exception to the parental immunity doctrine. By
vacating the judgment in Stallman I, the Illinois Supreme Court may
exception is no longer good
have indicated that the "family purpose"
221
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law. According
[I]f the supreme court's vacation of the ruling in Stallman I
is to be given any meaning, it is that the so-called "family
purpose" exception to the immunity doctrine is not viable
under Illinois law. These somewhat muted holdings of the
supreme court in Stallman will have influence far beyond the
facts of the particular case. The lesson of Stallman is not only
that parent-child tort immunity survives in Illinois, but that it
exists without the family purpose exception which some aphad sought to engraft onto the immunity
pellate court panels 224
rule in recent years.
The Stallman court could have abrogated parental immunity but still
refused to recognize maternal prenatal civil liability. The parental
immunity doctrine has come under increasing criticism by legal scholars and their arguments have merit. 225 Furthermore, the jurisdictional
trend is toward abrogating the doctrine because of perceived inequitable results. 226 Nevertheless, for good or for ill, 227parent-child tort
immunity remains unequivocally the law in Illinois.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court in Stallman v. Youngquist rejected
maternal prenatal civil liability and drew the line against ever-expand221. Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 271, 531 N.E.2d at 356.

222. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
223. Kroll represented the defendant Bari Stallman in the Stallman case at both
the appellate and supreme courts.
224. Kroll & Horstman, Parent-ChildTort Immunity in Illinois, 78 ILL. B.J. 24,

28 (1990).

225. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
227. See Kroll & Horstman, supra note 224, at 29.
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ing prenatal tort liability. The court found the unique, symbiotic
relationship between a mother and her fetus a biological fact too
strong to be ignored. The court weighed the competing merits of a
fetus' interest in being born with a sound mind and body and a
woman's right to personal autonomy and resolved the conflict in
favor of the privacy rights of the mother. To hold otherwise, the
court concluded, would mean a recognition of a legal duty on the
part of the mother to insure that her child was born whole. A
recognition of this legal duty would have the inevitable effect of
subjecting to state scrutiny every moment of a woman's daily life.
The Stallman court, unwilling to be the agent of this state intrusion
into the privacy rights of women, rightfully avoided this harsh result
by articulating the dangers that the imposition of maternal prenatal
civil liability would entail.
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